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C ivil society organizations are often seen as repositories of social 
capital, and their existence is taken as evidence that the dilemma of 
collective action has been resolved and that there is a willingness to trust, 
share and cooperate. Thus, attitudes and structures are seen as two 
complementary elements in the social capital debate. This article suggests 
that attitudes and structures are not always matched. Research carried 
out in two Nicaraguan villages shows that there is a major contradiction 
between the structure of associational living and the structure of social 
capital at the local level. Rather than being agents of social transformation, 
organizations tend to institutionalize local divides in the form of social, 
political or economic segregation.
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Hume’s parable illustrates a fundamental dilemma of 
collective action: to cooperate or not to cooperate. 
Rationally speaking, everyone might be better off by 
cooperating, but a lack of trust means that we fail to 
take advantage of the benefits and opportunities of 
coordination and cooperation.
One solution to this dilemma is found in the 
concept of social capital, understood as dense, 
horizontal networks of civic engagement and widely 
shared norms of trust and reciprocity. Social capital 
seems to be the driving force behind democratic 
practices and economic prosperity (Putnam, 1993; 
Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995). In 
stable democracies with high levels of socio-economic 
development, associational life arises chiefly as the 
historical and almost natural result of the bottom-up 
accumulation of horizontal cooperation experiences 
among citizens. Willingness to trust, share and 
cooperate is closely linked to certain structures (such 
as organizations and associational membership) whose 
very existence demonstrates that the collective action 
dilemma has indeed been resolved. Attitudes and 
structures are therefore the two main elements in the 
social capital debate. Accordingly, the existence of 
a large number of organizations and high levels of 
associational membership tends to go hand in hand with 
high levels of trust (Putnam, 1993 and 2000).
Development actors have recognized the role that 
social capital and a strong, vibrant civil society can 
potentially play in development processes1 (Ostrom, 
2001). Since the 1990s, international development 
actors like the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), along with the 
European Union (EU) and national governments in the 
West, have clearly set out to strengthen civil society in 
developing countries (UNDP, 1993, p. 8; World Bank, 
1994, p. i; Edwards and Foley, 1998, p. 38; Fowler, 
2000, p. vii). The hope is that the civil society-based 
approach will prevail over development models based 
exclusively on the State or the market (Pieterse, 1996; 
Hulme and Edwards, 1997, pp. 4 and 5; Brett, 1996, 
pp. 5 and 6). And certainly, civil society organizations 
have become an important tool for increasing the 
effectiveness of anti-poverty policies and promoting 
social change, since their participatory approach to 
collective action has the potential to empower poor 
and vulnerable groups.
Recognition of the significant role of civil society 
has had some major repercussions. A signif icant 
proportion of development f inancing applications 
now come from civil society organizations. Donors’ 
enthusiastic willingness to give priority to civil society 
has created opportunities for organizations to establish 
I
The role of civil society, social capital and 
development policies
Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. ’Tis profitable 
for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you 
should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you 
have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your 
account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in 
expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that 
I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you 
to labour alone; you treat me in the same manner. The seasons 
change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual 
confidence and security.
David Hume (2000)
1 See, for instance, the World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.
org/poverty/scapital.
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themselves, grow, professionalize and extend their 
area of influence. Nonetheless, the large volume of 
organizations and associational membership that now 
exists might say more about strategic choices, financing 
opportunities and “associational entrepreneurship” than 
about any upsurge in cooperativeness in any given 
population. This view is supported by researchers 
analysing the extremely low levels of trust and the 
predominance of clientelism in developing countries. 
There is some scientific research to show that, on 
average, just 16% of Latin Americans trust their 
fellow citizens, while in Europe the proportion is 
60% (Latinobarómetro, 2005, p. 32). Transparency 
International states that countries like Nicaragua have 
entered a situation of hypercorruption, equalled only in 
degree by the culture of tolerance towards those who 
fail to live up to their obligations.2 Throughout the 
region, the shared inheritance of mistrust is reflected 
in social interaction patterns. Latin America seems 
to be characterized and dominated by verticalism 
and clientelism, and what this basically reveals are 
fragmentation and an inability to achieve horizontal 
cooperation (Gambetta, 1988; Latinobarómetro, 2006). 
All this appears to indicate that, where social capital 
is concerned, in situations of low socio-economic 
development there may be a separation or even 
contradiction between attitudes (trust and horizontal 
cooperation) and structures (associational vitality). 
At the political level, this could mean that the civil 
society-based approach may not necessarily be tied 
to the construction, generation and implementation of 
trust, horizontal cooperation and participation.
The main aim of this article is therefore to 
investigate whether, in a Third World setting, any 
relationship can be found between associational 
membership and the “attitudinal” components of social 
capital, as partly suggested by the literature.
To address the subject, the present article will 
attempt to answer a number of questions. Is associational 
life tied to attitudes of horizontal cooperation and trust, 
and does such horizontal cooperation exist? Or is it 
tied mainly to vertical, clientelist access? In other 
words, what are associations promoting? Do they play 
an effective role as bringers of change, or do they 
merely posture against vertical, clientelist networks? 
As bringers of social change, they are expected to 
work against the logic of such networks, which keep 
the poor and vulnerable in positions of dependency. In 
an ideal development situation, aid channelled through 
organizations should foster and stimulate cooperative, 
dependable, inclusive and horizontal patterns of social 
interaction. Added to this, special attention should be 
paid to the poor and vulnerable, given the need to 
do something about their position of exclusion. It is 
therefore imperative to analyse whether organizations 
are reaching poor groups effectively.
The data presented here were collected in 1999 
as part of the author’s own research in two Nicaraguan 
peasant villages: El Toro, with 103 families, and La 
Danta, with 74. In each village, 65 families were 
interviewed. First, organizations, membership structures 
and recruitment mechanisms were examined. Then, 
information was collected on informal horizontal 
cooperation mechanisms. The information gathered 
shows that organizations are heavily dependent upon 
local leaders and their informal networks, which 
suggests that they are probably reaffirming the social 
interaction patterns of the two villages rather than 
changing them. Their effectiveness in reaching the poor 
is also very largely determined by local networks. The 
data show that if these local networks already include 
poor groups, then the organizations reach them; if not, 
vulnerable groups remain beyond their field of action 
and development interventions.
It should be pointed out that the data collected do 
not serve to analyse the direction of causality, so the 
ambitions of this article are modest. A debate about 
causality would be useful if a significant link were 
found between organizations, trust and reciprocity. In 
the absence of any significant relationship, there is little 
to be said about causality.
2 See http://www.ibw.com.ni/~ien/c5-7.htm.
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El Toro and La Danta are isolated peasant villages in 
the poorest area of the Chinandega region of Nicaragua, 
very near the border with Honduras. The two villages 
are very different. El Toro is one of the agrarian reform 
villages, as they are known in Nicaragua. These villages 
were originally organized as production cooperatives 
and received many benefits during the Sandinista 
regime in the 1980s. Following the electoral defeat of 
the regime in 1990, the cooperatives’ assets (land and 
livestock) were privatized and divided up equitably 
among the inhabitants of the village concerned. In 
addition, inhabitants were often helped by national 
and international development agencies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The comarca 
(administrative district) of El Toro therefore already 
had high levels of socio-economic equality in the early 
1990s, and its infrastructure is much more advanced 
than that of La Danta. El Toro has public wells, 
electricity, and more and better education and health 
infrastructure, while houses are made of concrete. La 
Danta, on the other hand, was not an agrarian reform 
comarca. Furthermore, assistance from the Sandinista 
government and NGOs was limited, if not completely 
lacking.3 As a result, the village lacks many basic 
amenities, it has no electricity or public wells, houses 
are made of mud and the school and health centre are 
in poor condition.
Having said that, the two villages have much in 
common. In both El Toro and La Danta, over 75% of 
the population depend on agriculture, while at the time 
the research was conducted about 40% of the farmers 
in both comarcas were landless, which means that both 
villages have similar numbers of poor people. It is 
important to touch upon socio-economic developments 
in El Toro, which has moved from a fairly egalitarian 
situation (thanks to agrarian reform) to a more 
unequal one.4 Where socio-economic classification 
is concerned, the landless were categorized as the 
poorest group, farmers owning less than 50 hectares 
as the intermediate group and farmers owning 50 
hectares or more as the elite group.5 In terms of 
political preference, participants were classified as 
Sandinistas (left-wing opposition), liberals (right-wing 
party currently in power) or no preference. As regards 
associational structure, both villages have a comparable 
number of organizations with similar characteristics. 
Each village has three special interest groups (unions, 
peasants’ organizations), nine NGOs, four governmental 
institutions and a village committee (table 1).
All the organizations and institutions present in the 
two villages share the same participatory development 
perspective. They also have strong links with the 
outside world, as all of them have ties to the municipal 
authorities or the central government, national 
unions, regional development offices and national and 
international NGOs. The existence of these links is vital 
to all actors involved, as they can use them to channel 
tangible and intangible resources. The similarities 
between these organizations (participatory approach, 
developmental discourse and horizontal cooperation) 
II
Overview of associational life 
in the two villages
3 Interviews with project managers, government officials and NGO 
coordinators suggest that agrarian reform villages generally seem to 
find it more difficult to adopt cooperative, trusting behaviour than 
traditional villages. Those interviewed stated that the strong presence 
of the Sandinista party and national and international solidarity 
organizations in these villages had consolidated a “culture of non-
reciprocity”. They argued that the incessant inflow of benefits with 
nothing expected in return was partly responsible for the crisis in 
local relationships of reciprocity and cooperation. These issues are 
obviously only part of the picture and need to be researched rather 
than just assumed.
4 El Toro has gone in the space of a decade from a more or less 
egalitarian landowning structure to a quite unequal socio-economic 
situation. For reasons of space, this article will not examine the 
mechanisms involved in this development in any detail; suffice to 
say that lack of trust has helped to bring it about. This lack of trust 
means that “favours” and services are paid for in cash. Inhabitants 
therefore have to pay for access to certain services (land, oxen, 
information), and the poor in particular get further and further into 
debt and eventually have to sell livestock, land and other goods to 
clear their arrears. Some peasants have thus gradually descended 
into greater poverty. Again, agrarian reform, the Sandinista party and 
international solidarity all contributed to a culture of non-reciprocity 
during the 1980s.
5 Classification of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Agriculture.
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TABLE 1
Nicaragua (two villages): Structure and membership of organizations 
Organizations El Toro La Danta
Interest groups 2 3
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 7 6
Governmental institutions promoting project development 3 2
Village committee 1 1
Total number of organizations 13 12
Membership
Families in the village with at least one membership (%) 44 60
Families in the village with more than one membership (%) 25 32
Average memberships per family 0.8 1.2
Local leaders participating (four leaders per village) All All
Membership by political preference and socio-economic
status of village families 
Proportion of village families that are members, by political preference (%)
Among Sandinista families 79 93
Among liberal families 31 36
Among those with no political preference 27 58
Proportion of families that are members, by socio-economic status (%) 
Elite (50 hectares or more of land) 57 80
Landowning peasants (less than 50 hectares) 84 68
Landless peasants 20 64
Average number of memberships by political preference
All families 0.8 1.2
Sandinista families 1.7 2.2
Liberal families 0.3 0.5
Source: Prepared by the author.
contrast strongly with the theoretical divide between 
the State and civil society. Both governmental and 
non-governmental actors operate on the same terrain, 
organize the same kind of interventions and adopt 
similar approaches in the two villages. The similarities 
between the organizations are no doubt strengthened 
by the fact that they are all dependent upon donors and 
governed by donor guidelines.
To obtain a clearer picture of the characteristics of 
these organizations’ members in the two villages, the 
families were divided up according to their political 
preferences and socio-economic level (see table 1).6
The large number of organizations and extremely 
high (and in some cases multiple) membership costs 
confirm that the inhabitants of both villages are quite 
well organized. Furthermore, all local leaders are 
involved in associational activities. The four local 
leaders in each village are Sandinistas and act as 
coordinators for the associations in their respective 
villages. Each leader coordinates at least three 
organizations.
Most of the participants in organizations in both 
villages seem to be in a relatively good economic 
position, being either members of the elite or landowning 
6 When a farmer has to prepare a hectare of land for sowing, weeding 
alone could take up to 16 days if carried out single-handedly. Hiring 
a worker could halve the time taken to eight days, but would cost 
about 1.25 dollars a day in worker wages (i.e., 10 dollars for eight 
days’ work).
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peasants. This fits the pattern seen in earlier research: 
associational activity tends to be found among those 
who are not extremely poor.
Other studies also indicate that membership, 
cooperation and trust seem to be particularly difficult 
for the poorest (Inglehart, 1988; Newton, 1999). 
From the development perspective, however, it is poor 
and vulnerable groups that associations ought to be 
reaching. In La Danta, indeed, the poorest group is 
actually well represented in associations, but in El Toro 
only 20% of this group participates.
In both villages, participants seem to share a 
political preference for the Sandinistas, a characteristic 
that holds good when multiple membership is analysed. 
In both villages there were inhabitants with up to five 
memberships, most of them Sandinistas. Table 1 clearly 
shows that the average number of memberships is 
substantially higher among Sandinista inhabitants in 
both villages and lower among supporters of the Liberal 
party. The underrepresentation of liberals is marked in 
both villages, but in El Toro socio-economic status is an 
even more striking source of bias. Participation in both 
villages thus displays a structural bias. To understand 
the structure of non-participation, we will have to look 
at associations’ recruitment mechanisms.
III
Explanation of preferences
The Sandinista bias in membership is closely related 
to the history of a large number of organizations in 
Nicaragua. In the 1980s, the Sandinista government 
encouraged and welcomed all left-wing associational 
initiatives. In the 1990s, however, there was an even 
bigger surge in the number of associations, most of 
them progressive.7 Although most of the country’s 
left-wing organizations distanced themselves from 
the Sandinista party after its electoral defeat in 1989, 
this probably made no appreciable difference to 
local membership structures. In any event, given the 
history of the country, Sandinista overrepresentation in 
membership structures was only to be expected.
Another extremely important but often overlooked 
point is that organizations in developing countries 
always bring projects, and hence resources, into 
communities. Members seem to be the first beneficiaries 
of these tangible and intangible resources. In villages, 
some organizations use the “food for work” system. 
Farmers, for example, are offered food in return for 
effectively introducing (new) farming methods and 
technologies, and are also given materials like wire 
netting, corrugated iron, insecticide spray pumps and 
machetes. Some organizations have supplied their 
members with production materials and financial help, 
others with valuable market information on sesame 
prices, which strengthens farmers’ hand in negotiations 
with intermediate buyers. All organizations offer 
education through workshops and seminars. The volume 
of scarce resources managed by these organizations is 
quite impressive and the benefits of joining are tangible. 
If we consider that some residents of both villages 
accumulate up to five memberships then, surprisingly 
enough, the ideas of multiple membership and 
exclusion take on considerable economic significance. 
From the point of view of access to resources, joining 
becomes a privilege.
Informal networks strongly influence access to 
organizations, and thus access to resources is regulated 
through the direct and indirect ties that compose these 
networks. This turns resources into “social resources”, 
as they are embedded in social networks (Lin, 1982, 
p. 132).
“Why haven’t you joined an organization?”
“Because they won’t let me.”
“Who are they?”
“The leaders.”
“What do you mean by that?”
7 Obviously the ideas of excessive trust and social control coincide 
with the debate about creating emotional ties and reaching out to 
social capital. Too much trust, especially when based on group 
belonging, can have quite a number of negative effects (see, among 
others, Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 1998; Granovetter, 1982). However, 
authors seem to agree that, whenever collective development is 
concerned, the existence of integration networks is always better than 
fragmentation and isolation (Woolcock, 1998). This article is therefore 
mainly centred on aspects of social capital relating to integration, 
horizontal cooperation and trust, which are seen as necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for democratic development.
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“When an organization wants to do something 
here, like a project, they always arrange things 
with the local leaders, and they say: “If you know 
any good people, hardworking people who want 
to get involved, get them together and we’ll start 
the project.” So the leaders decide who is going 
to be in the group and they always pick the same 
ones.”
“Would you like to join?”
“Of course… they’re getting benefits and we never 
get anything…”
(Farmer in La Danta)
The above conversation and the remarks quoted 
below are excerpts from interviews conducted by the 
author. The above reflects the most widely held view 
in these villages. Non-participants feel excluded from 
associational life, and thus from access to resources. 
Membership is the strategy that secures access to these. 
For this reason, organizations can create conflict among 
local inhabitants as these seek to enter networks to get 
access to resources. The interviews revealed tensions 
within the villages, because some inhabitants were 
systematically included while others were left outside 
the associational structures. Organizations and local 
leaders themselves confirmed the importance of the 
latter’s role when it comes to recruiting members:
“Yes, I take charge of selecting the people who are 
going to be working on the project. Sometimes the 
organization puts forward requirements like age 
or sex or the amount of land they have to own. Of 
course I follow their instructions and then I pick 
the people I know best, people I can trust. I can’t 
make myself responsible for people I don’t know, 
because if they ‘screw up’ then the organization 
will blame me and I will lose the contact.”
(Local leader in La Danta)
Coleman (1990, p. 182) argues that leaders can be 
seen as occupying the position of brokers. A number of 
trustors (organizations) rely on these brokers to deploy 
resources properly among the trustees (members), 
who then work collectively to secure the benefits of 
the activity (project). The fact that local leaders are 
responsible for selecting members simultaneously 
decentralizes project execution and administration to 
those leaders. It seems, however, that this approach 
has advantages for the organizations themselves, as 
they are able to hold down their transaction costs by 
falling back on existing social networks of trust. This 
tendency to use social capital to carry projects through 
is a cause for concern, especially when organizations 
make use of existing networks without questioning their 
composition, structure and content, since they may in 
fact be vertical, i.e., they may be clientelist dependency 
networks. Essentially, this instrumental use of trust 
in the analysis and practice of development tends in 
the same direction as the thinking of the pragmatic 
school of social capital, which treats such capital as 
an instrument for mobilizing resources.
Networks are thus used to enhance effective 
control over project execution through a manageable 
group (a few local leaders); these leaders can be held 
responsible and penalized by the withdrawal of projects 
(and thus resources) from the community. In order to 
avoid this, leaders will deploy all their power resources 
to ensure completion of the project. This means that 
their power as brokers will probably be supplemented 
by power as providers of access to their personally 
owned resources (land, oxen, small amounts of money 
and food).
The more resources individuals control, the more 
hierarchical the position and the more hierarchical 
access to the organization will become. Those wishing 
to access these personal and social resources will have 
to offer compensations and reciprocity (Lin, 1995, 
pp. 687 and 688). Furthermore, those obtaining such 
access will be indebted to those providing it. This limits 
horizontal control, accountability, empowerment and 
genuine participation —the very goals that the civil 
society-based approach is meant to pursue. The power 
differences between organizations and local leaders, 
and between local leaders and the inhabitants, are just 
too large. At best, then, participation suits those above 
but penalizes those below. The available evidence 
suggests that the tendency in these cases is rather 
towards clientelism than towards genuine participation. 
This indicates that involvement in associational life 
has more to do with the mechanisms of clientelism 
than with a horizontally acting cooperative spirit. This 
being so, associations cannot credibly be regarded as a 
manifestation or source of the “attitudinal” components 
of social capital.
We have seen that the strong Sandinista bias 
observed can be explained by the historical evolution 
of the political opportunities that have moulded the 
character of associational life, having been created 
and nurtured mainly in Sandinista leadership structures 
at the local level. The consequence is that liberals 
cannot derive benefit from associational opportunities. 
These mechanisms do not, however, explain why 
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local leaders in La Danta select the poorest peasants 
to join associations, while those in El Toro do not. 
Not selecting the poorest peasants could be seen as 
wholly rational, since unreliability, mistrust and the 
abandonment of responsibilities could be expected to 
be more common in the lowest socio-economic classes 
(Inglehart, 1988, p. 1213; Newton, 1997, p. 181). The 
poor also tend to have low expectations of those around 
them and the world in general (Newton, 1997): they 
have more to lose and tend to scrutinize possible risks 
very closely because the rewards are uncertain and the 
risk of being let down is real. Thus, the recruitment 
behaviour of leaders in El Toro seems to follow this 
logic, even if it is to the detriment of the development 
goals of the civil society-based approach promoted 
by donors, since resources do not reach the poorest 
groups. In La Danta, on the other hand, resources do 
reach many of the poorest strata, but the question is 
why local leaders risk involving themselves with this 
seemingly unreliable group. The structure and content 
of local informal networks may provide the answer.
IV
Informal cooperation networks
According to Coleman (1990), the emergence and 
enforcement of norms is facilitated by the “closure” 
of networks. Such closure enhances the trustworthiness 
of social structures, thereby allowing obligations 
and expectations to proliferate. Otherwise it might 
be difficult to impose sanctions. Conversely, open 
networks lack these enforcement mechanisms.
To return to the subject of informal networks 
in the two villages under consideration, this article 
will seek to ascertain whether it is possible to find 
horizontal forms of cooperation in these generally 
vertical societies, and will analyse the way these relate 
to the more clientelist dimension of associational life. 
The idea is to investigate forms of cooperation that 
approximate to the horizontal, voluntary aspect of social 
capital. In both villages, such horizontal cooperation 
has taken the form of farmers exchanging labour 
with their neighbours. This cooperative arrangement 
is known as cambio de mano (“work swap”). In its 
simplest form, this informal rural sharing mechanism 
means that farmer A helps farmer B for a few days on 
the latter’s land and then farmer B returns the favour 
by working for a few days on farmer A’s land.
This mechanism offers considerable savings in 
an environment where money is extremely scarce 
and labour extremely costly. Cooperative networks of 
this kind are thus of great importance for the poorest 
peasants, as they save them a great deal of money. 
The rational thing to do is therefore to engage in 
these forms of cooperation, unless there is a lack of 
trust. Trust is fundamental here, since there is always 
a time lapse before the favour that has been done is 
returned, so the risk of being let down is real. The 
farmers interviewed explicitly stated that trust played 
a vital role in this mechanism, especially in the case 
of more complex forms of cambio de mano involving 
more than two actors.
The mechanism of trust in this type of cambio 
de mano basically works as follows: person A, who 
provides the service, trusts beneficiary B
(i) to acknowledge that he owes something to A, 
and
(ii) to execute one or more services in return 
(comparable in amount and/or quality with the 
service or services provided by A).
It is important that A not have to apply pressure 
to receive a service in return. If A has to invest time 
and energy in cajoling B to return the favour, the 
relationship might become strained. This mechanism 
is inherently delicate. Participants spontaneously offer 
one another favours and services “in return”, but 
without overloading the other party with demands or 
obligations. If after some time the parties involved feel 
that no-one is trying to “have their cake and eat it”, 
these cooperative arrangements may eventually evolve 
into complex, many-faceted support mechanisms 
in which all those concerned can benefit from the 
capabilities, knowledge and relationships of the other 
members of the cooperative community.
Participants in cambio de mano arrangements 
argue that, in principle, their “job for job” relationship 
involves an “equal swap”. Symmetry between the 
actions of those involved is vital in this relationship. 
If one of the parties started to neglect the obligations 
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deriving from it, trust and reciprocity might start to 
break down. Failure to live up to expectations can 
have direct consequences. Again, the accountability 
mechanism in relationships of this type is informal 
and horizontal. To keep the relationship alive, it is 
necessary to attend to the mechanism that ensures its 
horizontality: the equality of rights and obligations.
Table 2 shows that only 35% of families in El 
Toro are involved in cambio de mano relationships, 
while in La Danta the proportion is 78%. This 
indicates that the great majority of people in La Danta 
are cooperating horizontally with one another. An 
important characteristic of networks is whether or not 
they are connected. Actors in a disconnected network 
may be grouped into two or more sub-networks that are 
not linked with each other. Thus, the more sub-networks 
a network has, the more disconnected it will be 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 109). We can see that, 
in La Danta, a very large group is organized into just 
five sub-networks. In El Toro, on the other hand, a small 
group of farmers is organized into 10 disconnected 
sub-networks. Sub-networks do not, however, provide 
specific information about the density of networks. In 
a dense network, there is a path between every pair 
of actors, which means that all actors are mutually 
accessible. The accessibility coefficient thus equals 1, 
the maximum value. The coefficient is 0.59 in La Danta 
and 0.12 in El Toro. Network analysis has also shown 
the average number of cambio de mano relationships 
to be significantly higher in La Danta than in El Toro. 
This means that not only are more families in La 
Danta involved in cambio de mano, but each family 
also averages more relationships of this type with other 
families. Furthermore, all associational leaders in La 
Danta are involved in cambio de mano arrangements, 
whereas in El Toro not one local leader has cooperative 
relationships of this type with villagers.
Generally speaking, there is a considerable amount 
of horizontal cooperation and trust in La Danta. This 
high density indicates near-closure of networks, and 
this makes them more effective in terms of compliance 
with norms of reciprocity. Considering the number of 
families involved and the fact that local leaders are 
subject to the same norms of accountability, the village 
of La Danta seems to be less hierarchical and more 
inclusive and integrated, and to have more horizontal 
trust and reciprocity, than El Toro. Furthermore, the 
presence of local leaders in the cooperative networks 
of La Danta suggests that they are subject to internal 
social control mechanisms. In El Toro, the absence of 
TABLE 2
Nicaragua (two villages): Structure of informal cooperation networks and member 
characteristics
Network structure El Toro La Danta
Village families involved in network (%) 35 78
Number of sub-networks in the village  10 5
Accessibility coefficient  0.12 0.59
Average number of cambio de mano arrangements per family 0.6 1.8
Local leaders participating None All
Characteristics of member families
Participation of village families by political preference (%)
 Sandinistas 55 89
 Liberals 31 80
 No preference  40 63
Participation of village families by socio-economic status (%)
 Elite (50 hectares or more of land) 29 80
 Landowning peasants (less than 50 hectares) 55 88
 Landless peasants 40 71
Source: Prepared by the author.
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associational leaders from the informal cooperation 
network might indicate that they are not subject to 
horizontal accountability mechanisms, to the fair swap 
rule, or to mutual expectations and obligations. Social 
oversight of deviant behaviour would therefore appear 
to be much easier in La Danta than in El Toro.
The actors involved in both villages seem to be 
mainly Sandinistas and landowners. These data coincide 
with the profile of participants presented earlier. There 
is, however, a rather odd discrepancy. Whereas liberals 
in La Danta were very much underrepresented in the 
membership structure, no less than 80% of the liberal 
group is involved in this cooperative network (table 
2). Similarly, whereas landless peasants in El Toro 
are almost totally absent from associational life, in La 
Danta we find that about 40% of such peasants are 
informally cooperating in cambio de mano. Cross-
checking of the data on associational life against the 
data on cooperative relationships revealed the following 
pattern: in El Toro, half of all families not involved 
in formal participation structures do practise cambio 
de mano, as do half of all families that are involved 
in these formal structures. In La Danta, 20 of the 29 
families not involved in formal structures practise 
cambio de mano, and so do 34 of the 41 families that 
are thus involved. 
It can be said, then, that associational life is not 
necessarily linked to the “attitudinal” components of 
social capital. It transpires that the groups which were 
found to be underrepresented in the formal structures of 
participation in associational life are very much present 
in horizontal cooperation networks. In neither case 
does formal participation in associational activities and 
development processes seem to have much connection 
with the cooperative spirit. Both the recruitment 
mechanisms used and the data on cooperation structures 
requiring membership are indicative of divergence 
between the two phenomena.
More importantly still, it transpires that the 
strong presence of the poor in the networks of La 
Danta reduces the risk of non-compliance with 
associational obligations. Because the networks provide 
an environment in which reciprocity is generally 
expected, the leaders can include the poorest without 
there being a great risk of major non-compliance 
problems. The fact that large numbers of the poor are 
active in horizontal networks (especially in La Danta 
and to a lesser extent in El Toro) seems to call into 
question the traditional view of Latin America as a 
place where the poorest remain marginalized, isolated, 
unorganized, rather fatalistic and dependent on wealthy 
patrons (Huntington and Nelson, 1976).
V
Conclusion
The existence of a large number of associations with 
high levels of membership is not necessarily indicative 
of trust, reciprocity and horizontal cooperation. 
Associations do not always constitute a structural 
representation of the “attitudinal” components of 
social capital. Both the villages studied score similarly 
on associational life, yet in El Toro there are just a 
few small groups cooperating horizontally, whereas 
many people participate in horizontal networks in La 
Danta.
In both villages, associational life has proved to 
be subject mainly to clientelist patterns of interaction: 
actors attempt to gain access to resources via local 
leaders, who act as brokers between organizations 
and inhabitants. But a very different picture emerged 
when informal cooperation networks were studied: this 
approach brought us much closer to the “attitudinal” 
components of social capital, and we saw that 
the two villages differed considerably in terms of 
horizontal cooperation. If we had relied on the apparent 
relationship between associations and social capital, we 
would have concluded that both scored more or less 
the same on social capital.
This discovery of the mechanisms associated with 
cambio de mano networks reveals that these might be 
an alternative indicator for the horizontal, voluntary 
cooperation dimension of the social capital concept. 
It is necessary to find indicators of this kind in order 
to deconstruct the complex concept of social capital 
and its normative assumptions (Edwards and Foley, 
1998), especially in developing countries, since the 
policy implications can be significant.
As was stated earlier, high hopes surround the civil 
society-based approach to development cooperation. 
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6 129
ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN TWO NICARAGUAN VILLAGES  •  NADIA MOLENAERS 
Donors hope that organizations can forge social change 
by working against the vertical, clientelist grain and 
encouraging the inclusion of poor and vulnerable groups. 
The most recent forms of development cooperation 
have clearly opted to give a very important place to 
civil society organizations in the poverty reduction 
process (Fowler, 2000; Tikare, Youssef and others, 
2002; Booth, 2003). However, the facts presented here 
show that these objectives are somewhat simplistic, 
especially when held up against the complex realities 
faced by developing countries. We have seen that, in 
the case of Nicaragua, the associational landscape is 
not as pluralistic or as inclusive as is usually supposed. 
The idea of strengthening civil society so that it can 
forge social change may therefore be contradictory, as 
the very elements that stand in the way of social change 
may be entrenched in the workings of civil society.
The history and evolution of political opportunities 
colour the current composition of civil society and the 
local membership structure. We have seen that, in 
both the villages considered, certain groups (local 
Sandinistas in this case) are more organized than 
others, obtain access to organizations more easily and 
have leadership structures that are supported by some 
originating from outside the area (in the city, the capital 
or abroad). Organizations decentralize their operations 
by transferring power to local leaders, who can then 
choose the participants and distribute resources. Thus, 
the effectiveness of the development efforts made by 
organizations seems to be largely determined by the 
local structure of the informal networks which sustain 
and reinforce them. If these informal networks are 
reasonably inclusive, horizontal, dense and governed 
by accountability mechanisms, and if they include 
leaders and their followers, both rich and poor (as 
in La Danta), then they will make a contribution to 
what the associations are supporting, developing and 
encouraging. However, if networks are exclusive and 
clientelist, then the associations and their projects will 
also be contributing to that type of social organization. 
Seen in this light, “participation” may reproduce and 
reinforce the domination of leaders and elites (Kapoor, 
2004, p. 2, and 2005, p. 1210).
The participation of local leaders in informal 
cooperation networks prevents them from abusing 
their position of power, as they are subjected to 
internal mechanisms of social control through dense 
networks. Thus, networks in La Danta promote 
integrity (Coleman 1988 and 1990), but in El Toro 
this is not the case. Local leaders in the latter do not 
participate in horizontal cooperation networks, the 
networks themselves are quite fragmented, and only 
a small number of people participate in them; in 
Coleman’s view, this indicates the difficulty of creating 
an environment of trust where norm compliance and 
reciprocity can be maintained. Thus, when associations 
have to relate to environments like El Toro, they are 
effectively institutionalizing verticalism and clientelism 
and reinforcing the unchecked power of leaders. It is 
therefore obvious that, in both villages, horizontal and 
trust-based relationships are much more likely to be 
found in informal than formal networks. It thus seems 
very unlikely that the latter can be regarded as sources 
of trust. In both villages there are groups that cooperate 
horizontally and have relationships of trust even though 
they do not have access to associations, either because 
they have the wrong political preference (as in La 
Danta) or because they are not connected with local 
leaders (as in El Toro), since the latter are absent from 
horizontal networks. The trouble is that organizations 
also consolidate and institutionalize this exclusion. 
The biased structure of participation is probably due 
mainly to biases in informal networks, something that 
is indicative of divisions. Divisions are not an issue 
in themselves as long as all groups can obtain access 
to scarce resources within their respective structures. 
This is not the case in the villages studied, however, 
because the associational landscape is not diversified 
enough, or because organizations lack the capabilities, 
time or resources to carefully study the places where 
they may become active.
These considerations bring us to some policy 
recommendations. First of all, the civil society-based 
approach within development practice is in urgent need 
of a critical review. The romantic, positive connotations 
surrounding the role, function and effects of a large 
and vibrant civil society in relation to democracy 
and economic development may prove simplistic or 
downright wrong in developing countries. The one-size-
fits-all approaches often imposed by donors ignore the 
idea that context matters. Thus, it seems utopian to wish 
to create social capital as though it were just another 
resource, an outcome to be expected from investment 
in a particular instrument.
When the context is taken into account, some 
questions and observations arise. Stimulating civil 
society organizations does not necessarily promote 
those attitudes that we tend to associate with social 
capital. If the consolidation of civil society is so vital, 
is it not also vital to support the diversification of 
civil society, or do we have to take it as it comes? 
Is participation a good tool in any context? To reach 
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the poor in fragmented, clientelist and mistrustful 
populations, it might be necessary to confront certain 
leaders or force them to compete. The solution to this 
problem will probably have to be top-down, involving 
the imposition of transparent selection or inclusion 
criteria. Only in this way will it really be possible to 
work for the benefit of the weakest groups (Van der 
Linden, 1997; Vandana, 1996). In other words, if the 
inclusion of certain groups is not a spontaneous bottom-
up process, it must be established and overseen from 
above. This implies effective, top-down imposition 
and implementation of transparent mechanisms in 
organizations and development interventions, including 
sanctions when commitments are not kept to.
Such, ironically enough, is the contradictory 
conclusion of this research: institutionalizing distrust 
is the only way to counteract clientelism and arbitrary 
exclusion. Thus, creating trust and thence social capital 
depends on the transparent working of institutions, 
projects and interventions, and on the possibility of 
preventing and punishing clientelist abuse of resources. 
Accordingly, donor organizations (both governmental 
and non-governmental) should not hand over all the 
power to their local intermediaries (leaders), but should 
keep a much tighter rein on the use of resources and 
the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.
All these observations point to the need for more 
development-inspired research. In the first place, it 
is important for there to be preliminary studies of 
the locality concerned to ascertain the composition 
of a given community and the relationship between 
its different groups. It seems imperative to avoid 
consolidating the positions monopolized by leaders, 
to diversify sources of information and to increase the 
chances of reaching truly poor and vulnerable groups. 
Determining how far the networks of leaders penetrate 
and what their inclusion and access criteria are might 
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